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Abstract
We extend the topos-theoretic treatment given in previous papers
[2, 3, 4] of assigning values to quantities in quantum theory. In those
papers, the main idea was to assign a sieve as a partial and contex-
tual truth value to a proposition that the value of a quantity lies in a
certain set ∆ ⊆ IR. Here we relate such sieve-valued valuations to val-
uations that assign to quantities subsets, rather than single elements,
of their spectra (we call these ‘interval’ valuations). There are two
main results. First, there is a natural correspondence between these
two kinds of valuation, which uses the notion of a state’s support for a
quantity (Section 3). Second, if one starts with a more general notion
of interval valuation, one sees that our interval valuations based on the
notion of support (and correspondingly, our sieve-valued valuations)
are a simple way to secure certain natural properties of valuations,
such as monotonicity (Section 4).
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1 Introduction
In three previous papers [2, 3, 4] we have developed a topos-theoretic per-
spective on the assignment of values to quantities in quantum theory. In par-
ticular, it was shown that the Kochen-Specker theorem [5] (which states the
impossibility of assigning to each bounded self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert
space of dimension greater than 2, a real number such that functional rela-
tions are preserved) is equivalent to the non-existence of any global elements
of a certain presheaf Σ, called the ‘spectral presheaf’. This presheaf is de-
fined in closely analogous ways on the category O of bounded self-adjoint
operators on a Hilbert space H (cf. [2, 3]), and on the category V of commu-
tative von Neumann subalgebras of the algebra of bounded operators on H
(cf. [4]).3
A key result of [2, 3, 4] is that, notwithstanding the Kochen-Specker
theorem, it is possible to define ‘generalised valuations’ on all quantities, in
which any proposition “A ∈ ∆” (read as saying that the value of the physical
quantity A lies in the Borel set of real numbers ∆) is assigned, in effect, a
set of quantities that are coarse-grainings (functions) of A. To be precise,
such a proposition is assigned as a truth value a certain set of morphisms
in the category O (or V), this set being required to have the structure of a
sieve. These generalised valuations can be motivated from various different
perspectives (cf. also [1]). In particular, they obey a condition analogous
to the FUNC condition of the Kochen-Specker theorem, which states that
assigned values preserve functional relations between operators, and certain
other natural conditions too. Furthermore, each (pure or mixed) quantum
state defines such a valuation. In Section 2 we will briefly recall the details
of these proposals and results.
In this paper, we shall extend this treatment in two main ways (Sec-
tions 3 and 4 respectively). Both involve the relation between sieve-valued
valuations and valuations that assign to a quantity A, not an individual
member of its spectrum, but rather some subset of it; (which we call ‘inter-
val valuations’). Though this idea seems at first sight very different from our
generalised valuations—that assign sieves to propositions “A ∈ ∆”—the two
types of valuations turn out to be closely related. In fact, there is a natural
3There is also a closely analogous presheaf—the dual presheaf D—that is defined on
the category W of Boolean subalgebras of the lattice L(H) of projectors on H; and the
Kochen-Specker theorem is also equivalent to the non-existence of any global elements of
D (cf. [2, 3]). But we shall not discuss W further in this paper.
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correspondence between them that uses the notion of the support of a state
for a quantity (Section 3). This correspondence is best expressed for the
case of V than for O since, by using von Neumann algebras as the base cate-
gory, various measure-theoretic technicalities can be immediately dealt with.
However, we shall also discuss the case of O, as it is heuristically valuable.
In Section 4, we describe how if one starts with a yet more general notion
of an interval valuation (i.e., one that does not appeal to the notion of sup-
port), one sees that our interval valuations based on the notion of support
(and correspondingly, our sieve-valued valuations) are a simple way to secure
certain natural properties of valuations, such as monotonicity.
2 Review of Our Framework
2.1 The categories O and V
We will first summarise the definitions given in the previous papers [2, 3, 4], of
the categories O and V that are defined in terms of the operators on a Hilbert
space, and over which various presheaves may be usefully constructed.
The objects of the category O are defined to be the bounded self-adjoint
operators on the Hilbert space H of some quantum system. A morphism
fO : Bˆ → Aˆ is defined to exist if Bˆ = f(Aˆ) for some Borel function f . On the
other hand, the objects V of the category V are defined to be the commutative
von Neumann subalgebras of the algebra B(H) of bounded operators on H.
The morphisms in V are the subset inclusions—so if V2 ⊆ V1, we have a
morphism iV2V1 : V2 → V1. Thus the objects in the category V form a poset.
The category V gives the most satisfactory description of the ordering
structure of operators. Some reasons for this were discussed in Section 2.1 of
[4]. In particular, each von Neumann algebra contains the spectral projectors
of all its self-adjoint members; so in a sense V subsumes both O and W (the
category of Boolean subalgebras of the lattice L(H)). More important in this
paper is the fact that in V issues about measure theory and spectral theory
are easier to treat than they are in O; though we will for heuristic reasons
keep O in play.
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2.2 The spectral presheaf on O and V
The spectral presheaf Σ over O was introduced in [2]. It assigns to each
object Aˆ in O its spectrum σ(Aˆ) as a self-adjoint operator: thus Σ(Aˆ) :=
σ(Aˆ) ⊆ IR. And it assigns to each morphism fO : Bˆ → Aˆ (so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ)),
the corresponding map from σ(Aˆ) to σ(Bˆ): Σ(fO) : σ(Aˆ) → σ(Bˆ), with
λ ∈ σ(Aˆ) 7→ f(λ) ∈ σ(Bˆ).
We now define the corresponding presheaf over V. We recall (see for
example, [6]) that the spectrum σ(V ) of a commutative von Neumann algebra
V is the set of all multiplicative linear functionals κ : V → |C; these are also
the pure states of V . Such a functional assigns a complex number κ(Aˆ) to
each operator Aˆ ∈ V , such that κ(Aˆ)κ(Bˆ) = κ(AˆBˆ). If Aˆ is self-adjoint then
κ(Aˆ) is real and belongs to the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ.
Furthermore, σ(V ) is a compact Hausdorff space when it is equipped with
the weak-∗ topology, which is defined to be the weakest topology such that,
for all Aˆ ∈ V , the map A˜ : σ(V )→ |C defined by
A˜(κ) := κ(Aˆ), (2.1)
is continuous. The function A˜ defined in Eq. (2.1) is known as the Gelfand
transform of Aˆ, and the spectral theorem for commutative von Neumann
algebras asserts that the map Aˆ 7→ A˜ is an isomorphism of V with the algebra
C(σ(V )) of complex-valued, continuous functions on σ(V ). The spectral
presheaf is then defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 The spectral presheaf over V is the contravariant functor
Σ : V → Set defined as follows:
• On objects: Σ(V ) := σ(V ), where σ(V ) is the spectrum of the commu-
tative von Neumann algebra V , i.e. the set of all multiplicative linear
functionals κ : V → |C.
• On morphisms: If iV2V1 : V2 → V1, so that V2 ⊆ V1, then Σ(iV2V1) :
σ(V1)→ σ(V2) is defined by Σ(iV2V1)(κ) := κ|V2, where κ|V2 denotes the
restriction of the functional κ : V1 → |C to the subalgebra V2 of V1.
When restricted to the self-adjoint elements of V , a multiplicative linear
functional κ satisfies all the conditions of a valuation, namely:
1. the (real) value κ(Aˆ) of Aˆ must belong to the spectrum of Aˆ;
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2. the functional composition principle (FUNC)
κ(Bˆ) = f(κ(Aˆ)) (2.2)
holds for any self-adjoint operators Aˆ, Bˆ ∈ V such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ).
It follows that the Kochen-Specker theorem can be expressed as the statement
that (for dimH > 2) the presheaf Σ over V has no global elements. Indeed,
a global element of Σ over V would assign a multiplicative linear functional
κ : V → |C to each commutative von Neumann algebra V in V in such a way
that these functionals ‘match up’ as they are mapped down the presheaf:
i.e., the functional κ on V would be obtained as the restriction to V of the
functional κ1 : V1 → |C for any V1 ⊇ V . So such a global element would yield
a global valuation, obeying FUNC Eq. (2.2), on all the self-adjoint operators:
a valuation that is forbidden by the Kochen-Specker theorem.
2.3 The coarse-graining presheaf on O and V
Our chief concern is with generalised valuations, which are not excluded by
the Kochen-Specker theorem. These are given by first introducing another
presheaf—the coarse-graining—presheaf, which gives us a structured collec-
tion of propositions about the values of quantities. We summarise the ideas
behind the coarse-graining presheaf in this subsection and the next. Then
we use the topos-theoretic idea of the subobject classifier to assign sieves as
partial, and contextual, truth values to these propositions (Section 2.5).
We begin by representing the proposition “A ∈ ∆”—that the value of
the physical quantity A lies in the Borel set ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ) ⊂ IR—by the corre-
sponding spectral projector for Aˆ, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] (as we will see below, and as
discussed in detail in [4], Section 3, this last statement needs to be qualified
as regards V). The coarse-graining presheaf is then defined so as to reflect
the behaviour of these propositions as they are mapped between the different
stages of the base category. Specifically, the coarse-graining presheaf over O
is defined ([2], Defn. 4.3) as the following contravariant functorG : O → Set:
• On objects in O: G(Aˆ) := WA, where WA is the spectral algebra of Aˆ
(i.e., the set of all spectral projectors for Aˆ);
• On morphisms in O: If fO : Bˆ → Aˆ (i.e., Bˆ = f(Aˆ)), then G(fO) :
WA → WB is defined as
G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. (2.3)
4
Note that the action of this presheaf coarsens propositions (and their asso-
ciated projectors) in the sense that, in the partial-ordering of the lattice of
projectors, Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] ≥ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆], and where the strict inequality
arises when f is not injective.
One subtlety is that for ∆ a Borel subset of σ(Aˆ), f(∆) need not be Borel.
This is resolved in [2], theorem (4.1), by using the fact that if Aˆ has a purely
discrete spectrum (so that, in particular, f(∆) is Borel) then
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] = inf{Qˆ ∈Wf(A) ⊆WA | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Qˆ} (2.4)
where the infimum of projectors is taken in the (complete) lattice structure
of all projectors on H. This motivated the use in [2] of Eq. (2.4) to define
the coarse-graining operation for a general self-adjoint operator Aˆ: i.e., the
projection operator denoted by Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] is defined using the right
hand side of Eq. (2.4).
This infimum construction is used again in our definition of G over V.
Specifically, we define:
Definition 2.2 The coarse-graining presheaf over V is the contravariant
functor G : V → Set defined as follows:
• On objects: G(V ) is the lattice L(V ) of projection operators in the
commutative von Neumann algebra V .
• On morphisms: if iV2V1 : V2 → V1 then G(iV2V1) : L(V1)→ L(V2) is the
coarse-graining operation defined on Pˆ ∈ L(V1) by
G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ) := inf{Qˆ ∈ L(V2) | Pˆ ≤ iV2V1(Qˆ)} (2.5)
where the infimum exists because L(V2) is complete.
The spectral and coarse-graining presheaves will play a central role in
the subsequent discussion. First, however, we recall that the interpretation
of the propositions “A ∈ ∆” is more subtle for the base category V than
for O (as discussed in [2, 3]). For we interpret a projector Pˆ ∈ L(V ) as a
proposition about the entire stage V1. Formally, we can make this precise in
terms of the spectrum of the algebra V . That is to say, we note that:
• Any projector Pˆ ∈ L(V ) corresponds not only to a subset of the spec-
trum of individual operators Aˆ ∈ V (where Pˆ ∈ WA so Pˆ = Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
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for some ∆ ⊂ σ(Aˆ)), but also to a subset of the spectrum of the whole
algebra V , namely, those multiplicative linear functionals κ : V → |C
such that κ(Pˆ ) = 1. It will be convenient in Section 2.4 et seq. to have
a notation for this subset, so we define V (Pˆ ) := {κ ∈ σ(V ) : V → |C |
κ(Pˆ ) = 1}.
• Coarse-graining respects this interpretation in the sense that if we in-
terpret Pˆ ∈ L(V1) as a proposition about the spectrum of the al-
gebra V1, then the coarse-graining of Pˆ to some V2 ⊂ V1, given by
inf{Qˆ ∈ L(V2) | Pˆ ≤ iV2V1(Qˆ)} is a member of L(V2), and so can be
interpreted as a proposition about the spectrum of the algebra V2.
This treatment of propositions as concerning the spectra of commuta-
tive von Neumann algebras, rather than the spectra of individual operators,
amounts to the semantic identification of all propositions in the algebra cor-
responding to the same mathematical projector. Thus when we speak of a
proposition “A ∈ ∆” at some stage V , with Aˆ ∈ V , we really mean the
corresponding proposition about the spectrum of the whole algebra V de-
fined using the projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]. In terms of operators, the proposition
“A ∈ ∆” is augmented : it can be thought of as the family of propositions
“B ∈ ∆B” about operators Bˆ ∈ V such that the projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] belongs
to the spectral algebra of Bˆ, and Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] = Eˆ[B ∈ ∆B].
2.4 G as the Power Object of Σ
In any topos, any object X has an associated ‘power object’ PX := ΩX ,
which is the topos analogue of the power set of a set. Accordingly, in a
topos of presheaves, any presheaf X has a ‘power presheaf’ P (X). This
presheaf P (X) assigns to each stage A of the base category the power set
P (X(A)) of the set X(A) assigned by X; and it assigns to each morphism
f : B → A in the base-category, the set-function from P (X(A)) to P (X(B))
induced in the obvious way from X(f) : X(A) → X(B). That is to say,
P (X)(f) : P (X(A))→ P (X(B)) is defined by
P (X)(f) : ∆ ∈ P (X(A)) 7→ (X(f))(∆) ∈ P (X(B)). (2.6)
But one can also consider more restricted power presheaves, whose as-
signment at a stage A contains only certain subsets of the set X(A). Indeed,
in [2] Section 4.2.3, it was noted that the coarse-graining presheaf G over
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O was essentially the same as the presheaf BΣ over O, which is defined
as assigning to each Aˆ in O the Borel subsets of the spectrum of Aˆ. The
presheaf BΣ on O was essentially the Borel power object of Σ, containing
those subobjects of Σ which are formed of Borel sets of spectral values, with
a projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ∈ G(Aˆ) corresponding to the Borel subset ∆ ⊂ Σ(Aˆ).
This connection between projectors and subsets of spectra—i.e., the fact
thatG is essentially the same as a restricted power presheaf of Σ—also holds
in the case of V, as follows.
A projection operator Pˆ ∈ V has as its Gelfand transform P˜ the charac-
teristic function of a subset of the spectrum of V , namely the set V (Pˆ ) of
multiplicative linear functionals κ on V such that κ(Pˆ ) = 1; in other words,
P˜ = χV (Pˆ ). This set is both closed and open (clopen) in the compact Haus-
dorff topology of σ(V ). Conversely, each clopen subset of σ(V ) corresponds
to a projection operator Pˆ whose representative function P˜ on σ(V ) is the
characteristic function of this subset.
So in analogy with BΣ on O, we define a similar presheaf on V, viz. the
clopen power object of Σ, which we will denote CloΣ:
• On objects: CloΣ(V ) is defined to be the set of clopen subsets of the
spectrum σ(V ) of the algebra V . Each such clopen set is the set V (Pˆ )
of multiplicative linear functionals κ such that κ(Pˆ ) = 1 for some
projector Pˆ ∈ V . So CloΣ(V ) = {V (Pˆ ) | Pˆ ∈ L(V )}.
• On morphisms: for V2 ⊂ V1, we define in accordance with Eqn (2.6)
CloΣ(iV2V1)(V1(Pˆ )) := CloΣ(iV2V1)
(
{κ ∈ σ(V1) | κ(Pˆ ) = 1}
)
= {λ ∈ σ(V2) | λ = κ |V2 for some κ ∈ V1(Pˆ )} (2.7)
The right hand side of Eq. (2.7) is clearly a subset of {λ ∈ σ(V2) |
λ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1}. But the converse inclusion also holds: i.e., any λ ∈
σ(V2) such that λ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1 is the restriction to V2 of some κ ∈ σ(V1)
such that κ(Pˆ ) = 1. This follows from Theorem 4.3.13 (page 266) of [6].4
This theorem concerns extending states from a subspace of a C*-algebra to
the whole C*-algebra. But using the fact that the set of pure states of a
commutative C*-algebra is its spectrum, the theorem, especially part (iv),
implies that λ ∈ σ(V2) can be extended to a κ ∈ σ(V1), with κ chosen so that
4We thank Hans Halvorson for this reference.
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κ(Pˆ ) = c for any c such that:
c ≥ sup{λ(Eˆ) | Eˆ is a projector in V2 and Eˆ ≤ Pˆ} (2.8)
c ≤ inf{λ(Eˆ) | Eˆ is a projector in V2 and Pˆ ≤ Eˆ} (2.9)
For our case of c = 1, the first constraint Eq. (2.8) is trivial. And the infimum
in the second constraint, Eq. (2.9), is 1; for the fact that G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) ≤ Eˆ
for all Eˆ ∈ V2 such that Pˆ ≤ Eˆ implies that λ(Eˆ) = 1 for all Eˆ ∈ V2 such
that Pˆ ≤ Eˆ. So λ has an extension κ such that κ(Pˆ ) = 1.
This result, that {λ ∈ σ(V2) | λ = κ|V2 for some κ ∈ V1(Pˆ )} = {λ ∈
σ(V2) | λ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1}, implies that G and CloΣ are isomorphic in
the topos of presheaves on V. Here isomorphism means as usual that: (i)
there is a natural transformation N from G to CloΣ, i.e., a family of maps
NV : G(V ) → CloΣ(V ) for each stage V in V such that the diagram for
V2 ⊆ V1:
CloΣ(V1)xNV1
G(V1)
restriction−→
G(iV2V1 )−→
CloΣ(V2)xNV2
G(V2)
(2.10)
commutes; and (ii) N is invertible.
Such a natural transformation is provided by NV : Pˆ ∈ G 7→ V (Pˆ ) ∈
CloΣ(V ). With this definition of N , the requirement that the diagram in
(2.10) commutes is
V1(Pˆ )|V2 = V2[G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )] (2.11)
which is just the result that {λ ∈ σ(V2) | λ = κ|V2 for some κ ∈ V1(Pˆ )} =
{λ ∈ σ(V2) | λ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1}. This natural transformation N is in-
vertible since any clopen set ∈ CloΣ(V ) is of the form V (Pˆ ) for a unique
projector Pˆ ∈ G(V ).
To sum up, we can think of G on V as being the clopen power object of
Σ on V. This isomorphism will be important in Section 3.
2.5 Sieve-Valued Generalised Valuations
We now describe how to use the topos-theoretic idea of a subobject classifier
to assign sieves as partial and contextual truth values to the propositions
provided by the coarse-graining presheaf; (propositions that, for V as base
category, are “augmented” in the sense discussed at the end of Section 2.3).
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As mentioned in Section 1, these sieve-valued valuations have certain
properties which strongly suggest that they are appropriate generalisations
of the usual idea of a valuation. In particular, they satisfy a functional
composition principle analogous to Eq. (2.2). Furthermore, these valuations
can be motivated from various different perspectives, discussed in [2, 3, 1].
The main motivation, which applies equally to either O or V as base category,
lies in the facts that:
1. For any base-category, C say, the subobject classifier Ω in the topos of
presheaves SetC
op
is the presheaf that (i) assigns to each A in C the set
Ω(A) of all sieves on A, where a sieve on A is a set of morphisms in C
with codomain A that is ‘closed under composition’, i.e. if S is sieve
on A and f : B → A is a morphism in S, then for any g : C → B,
the composite f ◦ g : C → A is in S; and (ii) assigns to each morphism
f : B → A in C, the pullback map on sieves Ω(f) : Ω(A)→ Ω(B); (cf.
[2], Appendix).
We note that the base-category of most interest for us, V, is a poset;
and since in a poset there is at most one morphism between objects,
sieves can be identified with lower sets in the poset. Thus on V, the
subobject classifier Ω is as follows:
• On objects: Ω(V ) is the set of sieves in V on V . We recall that
Ω(V ) has (i) a minimal element, the empty sieve, 0V = ∅; and
(ii) a maximal element, the principal sieve, trueV =↓ V := {iV ′V :
V ′ → V | V ′ ⊆ V } = {V ′ | V ′ ⊆ V }.
• On morphisms: Ω(iV2V1) : Ω(V1) → Ω(V2) is the pull-back of the
sieves in Ω(V1) along iV2V1 defined by:
Ω(iV2V1)(S) = i
∗
V2V1
(S) := {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 | iV2V1 ◦ iV3V2 ∈ S}(2.12)
= {V3 ⊂ V2|V3 ∈ S} (2.13)
for all sieves S ∈ Ω(V1).
2. In any topos of presheaves SetC
op
, morphisms from an arbitrary presheaf
X to the subobject classifier Ω generalize the characteristic functions
χ in set theory that map an arbitrary set X to the two classical truth
values {0, 1}. In particular, just as the characteristic function χK :
X → {0, 1} for a given subset K ⊆ X encodes the answers to the
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questions for each x ∈ X, “x ∈ K?”, so also the morphism χK : X→ Ω
for a given subobject (sub-presheaf) K of X encodes the answers to the
questions for each stage A in the base-category, and each x ∈ X(A),
“at what stage does a ‘descendant’ of x enter K?”.
Thus the sieves can be considered as generalized—more precisely, par-
tial and contextual—truth values.
The actual definition of a sieve-valued generalised valuation on V is as
follows. (The definition on O can be obtained mutatis mutandis.)
Definition 2.3 A sieve-valued generalised valuation on the category V in a
quantum theory is a collection of maps νV : L(V ) → Ω(V ), one for each
‘stage of truth’ V in the category V, with the following properties:
(i) Functional composition:
For any Pˆ ∈ L(V) and any V ′ ⊆ V , so that iV ′V : V
′ → V , we have
νV ′(G(iV ′V (Pˆ )) = i
∗
V ′V (νV (Pˆ )) (2.14)
where i∗V ′V is the pull-back of the sieves in Ω(V ) along iV ′V defined by
Ω(iV ′V )(S) := i
∗
V ′V (S) := {iV ′′V ′ : V
′′ → V ′ | iV ′V ◦ iV ′′V ′ ∈ S}(2.15)
for all sieves S ∈ Ω(V ).
(ii) Null proposition condition:
νV (0ˆ) = 0V (2.16)
(iii) Monotonicity:
If Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ L(V ) with Pˆ ≤ Qˆ, then νV (Pˆ ) ≤ νV (Qˆ). (2.17)
We may wish to supplement this list with:
(iv) Exclusivity:
If Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ L(V ) with Pˆ Qˆ = 0ˆ and νV (Pˆ ) = trueV , then νV (Qˆ) < trueV
(2.18)
and
(v) Unit proposition condition:
νV (1ˆ) = trueV . (2.19)
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Note that in writing Eq. (2.14), we have employed Definition 2.2 to spec-
ify the coarse-graining operation in terms of an infimum of projectors, as
motivated by Theorem 4.1 of [2].
The topos interpretation of these generalised valuations remains as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2 of [2] and Section 4 of [3]. Adapting the results and
discussion to the category V, we have in particular the result that because
of the FUNC condition, Eq. (2.14), the maps NνV : L(V ) → Ω(V ) defined
at each stage V by:
NνV (Pˆ ) = νV (Pˆ ) (2.20)
define a natural transformation Nν from G to Ω. Since Ω is the subobject-
classifier of the topos of presheaves, SetV
op
, these natural transformations are
in one-to-one correspondence with subobjects of G; so that each generalised
valuation defines a subobject of G. We will pursue this topic in more detail
in Section 3.
2.6 Sieve-Valued Valuations Associated with Quantum
States
We recall (for example, [2], Definition 4.5) that each quantum state ρ defines
a sieve-valued generalised valuation on O in a natural way by
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) = 1}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1}. (2.21)
Thus the generalised valuation associates to the proposition “A ∈ ∆” at stage
Aˆ all arrows in O with codomain Aˆ along which the projector corresponding
to the proposition coarse-grains to a projector which is ‘true’ in the usual
sense of having a Born-rule probability equal to 1, which in our framework
corresponds to the ‘totally true’ truth value, the principal sieve ↓Bˆ at stage
Bˆ. This construction is easily seen to be a sieve, and satisfies conditions
analogous to Eqs. (2.14–2.19) for a generalised valuation on V ([2], Section
4.4).
We also recall that there is a one-parameter family of extensions of these
valuations, defined by relaxing the condition that the proposition coarse-
grains along arrows in the sieve to a ‘totally true’ projector. That is to say,
we can define the sieve
νρ,r(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) ≥ r}
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= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) ≥ r} (2.22)
where the proposition “A ∈ ∆” is only required to coarse-grain to a projector
that is true with some probability greater than r, where 0.5 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Furthermore, if one drops the exclusivity condition, one can allow prob-
abilities less than 0.5, i.e. 0 < r < 0.5.
Similarly, each quantum state ρ defines a sieve-valued generalised valu-
ation on V in a natural way. Recall from Section 2.3 that we interpret a
projector Pˆ ∈ L(V ) as an “augmented” proposition about the spectrum of
the commutative subalgebra V , rather than about the value of just one op-
erator. Thus we define a sieve-valued generalised valuation associated with
a quantum state ρ as follows:
Definition 2.4 The sieve-valued valuation νρV1 of a projector Pˆ ∈ V1 associ-
ated with a quantum state ρ is defined by:
νρV1(Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | ρ [G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )] = 1}. (2.23)
This assigns as the truth-value at stage V1 of a projector Pˆ ∈ L(V1), a sieve
on V1 containing (morphisms to V1 from) all stages V2 at which Pˆ is coarse-
grained to a projector which is ‘totally true’ in the usual sense of having
Born-rule probability 1.
One readily verifies that Eq. (2.23) defines a generalised valuation in the
sense of Definition 2.3. (The verification is the same, mutatis mutandis, as
for generalised valuations on O, given in Section 4.4 of [2].)
Again, we can obtain a one-parameter family of such valuations by intro-
ducing a probability r:
νρ,rV1 (Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | ρ [G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )] ≥ r}. (2.24)
2.7 Interval Valuations
The sieve-valued generalised valuations on O and V discussed in Sections
2.5 and 2.6 (and their analogues on W, discussed in [2, 3]) are one way
of assigning a generalised truth value to propositions in a way that is not
prevented by the Kochen-Specker theorem. We now turn to relating these to
another notion of ‘generalised valuation’, which we call ‘interval valuations’
since the intuitive idea is to assign some interval of real numbers to each
operator. Note that here ‘interval’ is used loosely: it means just some (Borel)
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subset of IR, not necessarily a connected subset; and more generally, it means
just some (Borel) subset of the spectrum one is concerned with (at a given
stage of the base-category).
In Section 4 of [4], we showed how this intuitive idea can be developed in
various ways, even for a single base-category. That discussion focussed on V,
and described how a sieve-valued generalised valuation on V—in particular
one associated with a quantum state—induces an ‘interval valuation’ in var-
ious senses of the phrase. These various senses differ about whether to take
the assigned intervals at the various stages to define:
(i) a subobject of Σ, or
(ii) a global element of G, or
(iii) a subobject of G.
But these different senses of ‘interval valuation’ are similar in that all are
defined in terms of the set of ‘totally true’ projectors at each stage V of the
base-category V. Thus for any sieve-valued valuation ν, we defined the truth
set
T ν(V ) := {Pˆ ∈ L(V ) | νV (Pˆ ) = trueV } (2.25)
so that, in particular, for the valuation νρ associated with the quantum state
ρ we have
T ρ(V ) := {Pˆ ∈ L(V ) | ρ(Pˆ ) = 1}. (2.26)
We used these truth sets in two ways. First, we defined interval valuations
that are subobjects of Σ by assigning to each stage V , the subset of the
spectrum σ(V ) consisting of all functionals that ‘make certain’ all members
of the truth set T ν(V ). That is, for any sieve-valued valuation ν, we assign
to V the set:
Iν(V ) = {κ ∈ σ(V ) | κ(Pˆ ) = 1, ∀Pˆ ∈ T ν(V )} =
⋂
Pˆ∈T ν(V )
V (Pˆ ). (2.27)
This assignment gives a subobject of Σ (meaning that if V2 ⊆ V1, then
Iν(V2) ⊇ I
ν(V1) |V2) provided the following condition (eqn (4.9) of [4])
If V2 ⊆ V1 then inf T
ν(V2) ≥ inf T
ν(V1) (2.28)
is satisfied—which it always is for the valuations νρ associated with quantum
states ρ because for these valuations T ν
ρ
(V2) ⊆ T
νρ(V1). It is also satisfied
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for the ‘probability r’ quantum valuations νρ,r, i.e. with truth sets defined
using Eq. (2.24).5
Second, we defined interval valuations that are global elements of G by
taking the infima of these truth sets (using the fact that L(V ) is a complete
lattice) to define what we called the support (of the valuation, or the quantum
state) at each stage V :
s(ν, V ) := inf T ν(V ) = inf{Pˆ ∈ L(V ) | νV (Pˆ ) = trueV } (2.29)
so that in particular, for the valuation νρ
s(ρ, V ) := inf T ρ(V ) = inf{Pˆ ∈ L(V ) | ρ(Pˆ ) = 1}. (2.30)
An example of an interval valuation that is a global element of G is given
by assigning to each stage V , the support at that stage, s(ν, V ) or s(ρ, V ).
This assignment gives a global element of G provided that supports (infima
of truth sets) ‘match up’ under coarse-graining in the usual sense that
If V2 ⊆ V1, then inf{Pˆ ∈ T
ν(V2)} =: s(ν, V2) = G(iV2V1)
(
inf{Pˆ ∈ T ν(V1)}
)
= G(iV2V1)(s(ν, V1)). (2.31)
This condition is satisfied for the valuations νρ associated with quantum
states ρ (but not for the ‘probability r’ quantum valuations νρ,r, i.e. with
supports s(νρ,r, V ) defined on analogy with Eq. (2.29) but using Eq. (2.24)).
We note that the notion of an interval valuation that is a global element
of G is stronger than the notion of a subobject of Σ (treated in case (i)
above) in the sense that any global element of G defines a subobject of Σ
but not vice versa. Thus any global element γ of G—i.e. an assignment γ
such that if V2 ⊂ V1 then γ(V2) = G(iV2V1)(γ(V1))—defines a subobject I
γ of
Σ by
Iγ(V1) := V1(γ(V1)) = {κ ∈ σ(V1) | κ(γ(V1)) = 1} (2.32)
since κ(Pˆ ) = 1 implies κ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1, so that I
γ(V1)|V2 ⊆ I
γ(V2). We
can also put this in terms of the isomorphism N in Section 2.4 between G
and CloΣ whose component maps NV : Pˆ ∈ G(V ) 7→ V (Pˆ ) ∈ CloΣ carry
the global element γ of G into a global element of CloΣ, i.e. a subobject of
Σ.
5Eqn. (2.27) shows how ‘interval’ is here used abstractly: an algebra V is assigned a
subset of its spectrum, i.e. a set of multiplicative linear functionals on V which corresponds
to a subset of the spectrum of each operator in the algebra.
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3 The Correspondence between Intervals and
Sieves
3.1 Prospectus
So much by way of review. In the rest of this paper we shall report some
new results about the relation between sieve-valued valuations and interval
valuations; where both of these notions will be understood more generally
than in Sections 2.5 to 2.7. However, in this Section (though not Section 4)
all the interval valuations to be discussed will be like those in Section 2.7, in
the sense that they will be based on the notion of truth sets and associated
ideas (especially the infima of truth sets, i.e., supports).6
In this Section, we will discuss a kind of correspondence between sieve-
valued valuations and interval valuations. So despite the marked differences
between sieve-valued valuations and interval valuations—for example, in V
we see projectors or propositions versus algebras as arguments, and sieves
versus sets of linear functionals as values—it turns out that they correspond.
Indeed, in a sense they mutually determine each other. We have already seen
in Section 2.7 how sieve-valued valuations determine interval valuations, via
the idea of truth sets. The converse determination, of sieve-valued valuations
by interval valuations, is simplest for the case where the interval valuations
are global elements of G; i.e. for case (ii) of Section 2.7, where we use not
just truth sets, but their infima, supports. We shall present this in Section
3.2.1.
Then in Section 3.2.2 we shall discuss case (i) in Section 2.7, where the
interval valuations are subobjects of Σ.
In both this Section and the next, our discussion will again concentrate on
V since, as mentioned in the Introduction, using V avoids measure-theoretic
difficulties about the spectra of operators (and functions of them) which arise
inO. But since our results about V are rather abstract, it will be heuristically
helpful to report the corresponding claims about O; i.e. to state what our
results imply about presheaves over O at those stages (i.e. operators) of
O that do not have these measure-theoretic difficulties. (These stages will
6So as in [4], we are not concerned here to appeal to interval valuations to solve the
measurement problem, namely by assigning intervals to some or all quantities that are
‘narrow’ enough to give definite results to quantum measurements and yet ‘wide’ enough
to avoid the Kochen-Specker and other ‘no-go’ theorems. For a recent discussion of this
strategy, as it occurs within the modal interpretation, cf. [7].
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include all operators with a pure discrete spectrum.) So we report these
corresponding claims about O in Section 3.3.
3.2 The Correspondence in V
3.2.1 The case of global elements of G
The correspondence between sieve-valued valuations and interval valuations
is simplest for the case where the interval valuations are global elements ofG.
In each ‘direction’, there is a natural and simple sufficient condition for cor-
respondence, satisfied by ‘most’ of the valuations discussed in Sections 2.5 to
2.7. More precisely: given a sieve-valued valuation α, and the corresponding
interval valuation, sα say, that α defines in terms of supports, then there is
a simple sufficient condition ((i) below) for α to equal a valuation naturally
defined by sα which takes sets of morphisms as values. And in the other
direction: given an interval valuation a and the corresponding valuation, αa
say, that a naturally defines and which takes sets of morphisms as values,
then a equals the interval valuation defined in terms of the supports of αa;
and there is a simple sufficient condition ((ii) below) for αa to be sieve-valued.
In fact, condition (ii) is that supports should form a global element of G.
But before stating these results it is illuminating to show that, taken
together, conditions (i) and (ii) are also sufficient to imply that a valuation is
an assignment of sieves, and also obeys FUNC. This claim is made precise in
Theorem 3.1. It shows that conditions (i) and (ii) taken together are sufficient
for an assignment α to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈ G(V ) := L(V ) of a set
of morphisms αV (Pˆ ) ⊆ {iV ′V : V
′ → V }, to satisfy three conditions. Namely,
the conditions: (a) that α is sieve-valued (i.e. each α(V ) is a sieve on V ); (b)
that α obeys FUNC; (c) that α obeys a characterization that encapsulates
the correspondence between sieve-valued valuations and interval valuations.
(This characterization will also lead in to the discussion in Section 4.)
We begin by noting that for any such α, i.e. any such assignments
αV (Pˆ ) ⊆ {iV ′V : V
′ → V }, we can define truth sets and (since L(V ) is
complete) supports, just as in Eqs. (2.25) and (2.29). So we write these
as T α(V ) and s(α, V ) respectively. Similarly, for any such α, the condition
that supports ‘match up’ under coarse-graining, makes sense; cf. Eq. (2.31),
substituting α for ν.
Theorem 3.1 Let α be an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈
G(V ) := L(V ) of a set of morphisms αV (Pˆ ) ⊆ {iV ′V : V
′ → V } with
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codomain V . Let T α(V ) and s(α, V ) be defined as in Eqs. (2.25) and (2.29)
respectively (just substituting α for ν). Suppose that α obeys:
(i) If V2 ⊆ V1 and Pˆ ∈ L(V1), then iV2V1 : V2 → V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ) iff s(α, V2) ≤
G(iV2V1)(Pˆ );
(ii) supports give a global element of G, i.e. they match up under coarse-
graining, in the sense of Eq. (2.31), i.e.
If V2 ⊆ V1, s(α, V2) = G(iV2V1)(s(α, V1)). (3.1)
Then:
(a) each αV (Pˆ ) is a sieve;
(b) α obeys FUNC, as in Eq. (2.14), i.e.,
αV2(G(iV2V1(Pˆ )) = i
∗
V2V1
(αV1(Pˆ )) (3.2)
(c) α obeys
αV1(Pˆ ) = {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | G(iV2V1)(s(α, V1)) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )}. (3.3)
Proof: (a): Given iV2V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ), the condition (i) and the monotonicity
of G(iV2V1) imply that for any V3 ⊆ V2, G(iV3V2)(s(α, V2)) ≤ G(iV3V1)(Pˆ ).
But by (ii), G(iV3V2)(s(α, V2)) = s(α, V3); so that by (i), iV3V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ).
(b): condition (i) implies that αV2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 |
s(α, V3) ≤ G(iV3V1)(Pˆ )} and that i
∗
V2V1
(αV1(Pˆ )) := {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 | iV2V1 ◦
iV3V2 ∈ αV1(Pˆ )} = {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 | s(α, V3) ≤ G(iV3V1)(Pˆ )}. (So result (b)
depends only on the condition (i)).
(c): Immediate: apply (ii) i.e., Eq. (3.1) to the condition in (i) that
s(α, V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ). QED.
In particular, the sieve-valued valuations associated with quantum states
(for probability 1, but not r with 0 ≤ r < 1) obey the conditions of Theorem
3.1. For we noted in Section 4.3 of [4] that (ii) i.e. Eq. (2.31), holds for
these valuations; and (i) holds trivially for them, since ρ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1
iff s(ρ, V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ).
We turn to describing how conditions (i) and (ii) are, respectively, natural
sufficient conditions for: (a) a sieve-valued valuation to be determined by an
interval-valued valuation that it itself determines; and (b) an interval valua-
tion to be determined by a sieve-valued valuation that it itself determines.
First, suppose α is an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈
G(V ) := L(V ) of a sieve on V . We can define truth sets and (since L(V ) is
17
complete) supports, as in Eqs. (2.25) and (2.29). Let us write these as T α(V )
and sα(V ) respectively. Then we define a valuation with sets of morphisms
as values, in terms of the sα(V ), by
αs
α
V1
(Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | s
α(V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )} (3.4)
and ask: does αs
α
V1
(Pˆ ) = αV1(Pˆ )? The answer is trivially: ‘Yes’ if and only
if α obeys condition (i) of Theorem 3.1. (We note incidentally that this
argument, including its definition of truth sets and supports, does not require
that the given α assign sieves. It is enough, as in Theorem 3.1, that α be
an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈ G(V ) := L(V ) of a set
of morphisms with codomain V : the conclusion, that αs
α
= α iff α obeys
condition (i), is unaffected.)
Second, suppose a is an assignment at each stage V in V of an element
of G(V ) := L(V ). (We do not for the moment require that a define a global
element of G.) Then we define a valuation αa, with sets of morphisms as
values, on all Pˆ in each G(V ) := L(V ), in terms of a, as follows:
αaV1(Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | a(V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )}. (3.5)
It follows that the support s(αa, V ), defined in the usual way (cf. Eq. (2.29))
is equal to a(V ). That is, suppose we define truth sets and supports for αa
in the usual way; cf. Eqs. (2.25) and (2.29). Then note that
Pˆ ∈ T α
a
(V ) iff a(V ) ≤ G(iV V )(Pˆ ) = Pˆ , (3.6)
so that s(αa, V ) := inf T α
a
(V ) = a(V ).
But under what conditions is αa sieve-valued (i.e. αaV1(Pˆ ) is always a
sieve)? In fact, the condition (ii) in Theorem 3.1—i.e. the condition that a
defines a global element of G—is a natural sufficient condition for this. For
suppose that iV2V1 ∈ α
a
V1
(Pˆ ), i.e. a(V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ), and pick any iV3V2 :
V3 → V2. Since G(iV3V2) is monotonic, we get G(iV3V2)a(V2) ≤ G(iV3V1)(Pˆ ).
Assuming (ii), i.e. G(iV3V2)a(V2) = a(V3), it follows that iV3V1 ∈ α
a
V1
(Pˆ ), i.e.
αaV1(Pˆ ) is a sieve.
3.2.2 The case of subobjects of Σ
We return to case (i) of Section 2.7. We recall that for any sieve-valued
valuation ν, the interval valuation that assigns to each stage V the subset
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of the spectrum σ(V ) consisting of all functionals that ‘make certain’ all
members of the truth set T ν(V ), i.e. the interval valuation of Eq. (2.27):
Iν(V ) := {κ ∈ σ(V ) | κ(Pˆ ) = 1, ∀Pˆ ∈ T ν(V )} =
⋂
Pˆ∈T ν(V )
V (Pˆ ) (3.7)
defines a subobject of Σ provided Eq. (2.28) is satisfied:
If V2 ⊆ V1 then inf T
ν(V2) ≥ inf T
ν(V1), i.e. s(ν, V2) ≥ s(ν, V1). (3.8)
(Incidentally, this argument does not require that ν be a sieve-valued val-
uation in the strong sense of Definition 2.3 (Section 2.5); it works for any
assignment, to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈ G(V ) := L(V ), of a sieve on
V .)
To obtain the analogue of Theorem 3.1 for the case of subobjects of Σ,
we note that condition (i) of Theorem 3.1 says that iV2V1 : V2 → V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ )
if and only if s(α, V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ), i.e. iff G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ) is certain at V2
according to α. So we expect the corresponding condition, for a subobject Iα
of Σ, to be that Iα(V2) ⊆ V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) (≡ V1(Pˆ )|V2 by the isomorphism
Eq. (2.11) in Section 2.4). Indeed we have:
Theorem 3.2 Let α be an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈
G(V ) := L(V ) of a set of morphisms αV (Pˆ ) ⊆ {iV ′V : V
′ → V } with
codomain V . Let T α(V ) and Iα(V ) be defined as in Eqs. (2.25) and (2.27)
respectively (just substituting α for ν). Suppose that α obeys:
(i) If V2 ⊆ V1 and Pˆ ∈ L(V1), then iV2V1 : V2 → V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ) iff I
α(V2) ⊆
V1(Pˆ ) |V2;
(ii) the intervals Iα give a ‘tight’ subobject of Σ in the sense that they match
up exactly under restriction, i.e.
If V2 ⊆ V1, then I
α(V2) = I
α(V1) |V2 : not merely I
α(V2) ⊇ I
α(V1) |V2 ; (3.9)
Then:
(a) each αV (Pˆ ) is a sieve;
(b) α obeys FUNC, just as in Eqs. (2.14) and (3.2), i.e.
αV2(G(iV2V1(Pˆ )) = i
∗
V2V1
(αV1(Pˆ )) (3.10)
(c) α obeys
αV1(Pˆ ) = {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | I
α(V1) |V2⊆ V1(Pˆ ) |V2} (3.11)
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Proof: (a): Given iV2V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ), the condition (i) and the monotonicity
of taking restrictions (i.e. if X and Y are sets of functions on a common
domain of which Z is a subset, then X ⊆ Y implies X|Z ⊆ Y |Z) imply that
for any V3 ⊆ V2, I
α(V2)|V3 ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V3. But (ii) implies I
α(V3) ⊆ I
α(V2)|V3; so
that Iα(V3) ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V3 and by (i), iV3V1 ∈ αV1(Pˆ ).
(b): condition (i) implies that αV2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 |
Iα(V3) ⊆ V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ))|V3}. But the isomorphism of G and CloΣ (cf. dia-
gram 2.10 and Eq. (2.11)) means that V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = V1(Pˆ )|V2; restrict-
ing both sides of this equation to any V3 ⊆ V2, we get V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ))|V3 =
V1(Pˆ )|V3 . On the other hand, condition (i) also implies that i
∗
V2V1
(αV1(Pˆ )) :=
{iV3V2 : V3 → V2 | iV2V1 ◦ iV3V2 ∈ αV1(Pˆ )} = {iV3V2 : V3 → V2 | I
α(V3) ⊆
V1(Pˆ )|V3}. (So result (b) depends only on the condition (i)).
(c): Immediate: apply (ii) i.e. Eq. (3.9) to the condition (i) that Iα(V2) ⊆
V1(Pˆ )|V2 . QED.
We remark that the analogy with Theorem 3.1 is very close, but we
could equally well have proven Theorem 3.2 first. Indeed, much of Theorem
3.2 can be stated and proved without mention of G. More precisely, the
coarse-graining map G(iV2V1)(·), taking projectors Pˆ ∈ G(V1) to projectors
in G(V2), is for the most part replaced by the map V1(·)|V2, taking projectors
Pˆ ∈ G(V1) to subsets of Σ(V2). In particular, only part (b) needs to mention
G and to make use of the isomorphism in Section 2.4 between G and CloΣ.
In particular, the sieve-valued valuations associated with quantum states
(for probability 1, but not r with 0 ≤ r < 1) obey the conditions of Theorem
3.2. For we noted in Section 4.4.1 of [4] that (ii) i.e., Eq. (3.9), holds for these
valuations. Besides, (i) holds for these valuations because of the isomorphism
between G and CloΣ, specifically Eq. (2.11), V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = V1(Pˆ ) |V2 ;
as follows. By the definition of νρ (cf. Section 2.6), iV2V1 : V2 → V1 ∈ ν
ρ
V1
(Pˆ )
iff G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ) ∈ T
ρ(V2). On the other hand, condition (i) for ν
ρ is that
Iρ(V2) ⊆ V1(Pˆ ) |V2≡ V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )), i.e. that if κ ∈ σ(V2) and κ(Pˆ ) =
1, ∀Pˆ ∈ T ρ(V2), then κ(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) = 1; which is just that G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ) ∈
T ρ(V2).
Furthermore, the discussion of the second half of Section 3.2.1 also carries
over mutatis mutandis; (though there is one difference). That is: conditions
(i) and (ii) are again, respectively, natural sufficient conditions for: (a) a
sieve-valued valuation to be determined by an interval-valued valuation that
it itself determines; and (b) an interval valuation to be determined by a
sieve-valued valuation that it itself determines.
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First, suppose α is an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈
G(V ) := L(V ) of a sieve on V . We can define truth sets as in Eq. (2.25),
i.e.,
T α(V ) := {Pˆ ∈ L(V ) | αV (Pˆ ) = trueV } (3.12)
and intervals as in Eq. (2.27), i.e.
Iα(V ) := {κ ∈ σ(V ) | κ(Pˆ ) = 1, ∀Pˆ ∈ T α(V )} (3.13)
Then we define a valuation with sets of morphisms as values, in terms of the
Iα(V ), by:
αI
α
V1
(Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | I
α(V2) ⊆ V1(Pˆ ) |V2}; (3.14)
and ask: does αI
α
V1
(Pˆ ) = αV1(Pˆ )? The answer is trivially: ‘Yes’ if and only if α
obeys condition (i) of Theorem 3.2. (As in Section 3.2.1, we note incidentally
that this argument, including its definition of truth sets and intervals, does
not require that the given α assign sieves. It is enough, as in Theorem 3.2,
that α be an assignment to each stage V in V and each Pˆ ∈ G(V ) := L(V )
of a set of morphisms with codomain V : the conclusion, that αI
α
= α if and
only if α obeys condition (i), is unaffected.)
Second, suppose a is an assignment at each stage V in V of a subset
a(V ) of Σ(V ) := σ(V ). (We do not for the moment require that a define a
subobject of Σ.) Then we define a valuation αa, with sets of morphisms as
values, on all Pˆ in each G(V ) := L(V ), in terms of a, as follows:
αaV1(Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | a(V2) ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V2}. (3.15)
As in Section 3.2.1 (after Eq. (3.5)), we ask whether the interval Iα
a
(V ),
defined in the usual way (cf. Eqs. (2.27), (3.12) and (3.13)) is equal to a(V ).
But in Section 3.2.1, the answer was automatically ‘Yes’; now it is not. For
defining truth sets and intervals in this way, we get:
Pˆ ∈ T α
a
(V ) iff a(V ) ⊆ V (Pˆ )|V = V (Pˆ ), (3.16)
so that κ ∈ σ(V ) is in Iα
a
(V ) if and only if for all Pˆ with a(V ) ⊆ V (Pˆ ), we
have κ(Pˆ ) = 1. All elements of a(V ) fulfill this condition so that a(V ) ⊆
Iα
a
(V ). But the converse inclusion requires that if κ /∈ a(V ) then there is Qˆ
with a(V ) ⊆ V (Qˆ) and κ(Qˆ) 6= 1. And in general this will not hold: if κ is
in the closure of a(V ), but κ /∈ a(V ), then any clopen (so closed) superset
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Y of a(V ) must contain κ; and any such Y is V (Qˆ) for some Qˆ. To get this
converse, and so a(V ) = Iα
a
(V ), the natural sufficient condition is that the
given sets a(V ) should be clopen. (Recall from Section 2.4 that every clopen
subset of σ(V ) corresponds to a projector whose Gelfand transform on σ(V )
is the characteristic function of the subset.)
But under what conditions is αa sieve-valued (i.e. αaV1(Pˆ ) is always a
sieve)? In fact, the condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2—i.e. the condition that a
defines a ‘tight’ subobject of Σ—is a natural sufficient condition for this. For
suppose that iV2V1 ∈ α
a
V1
(Pˆ ), so that a(V2) ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V2 , and pick any iV3V2 :
V3 → V2. Since restriction is monotonic, a(V2)|V3 ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V3 . Assuming (ii),
i.e. a(V2)|V3 = a(V3), it follows that iV3V1 ∈ α
a
V1
(Pˆ ), thus αaV1(Pˆ ) is a sieve.
3.3 The Correspondence in O
The discussion in Section 3.2 is quite abstract. So it is illuminating to present
the same ideas in a more concrete setting: namely, the valuations on O
associated with a quantum state ψ ∈ H, or more generally a density matrix
ρ, which (cf. Section 2.6, especially Eq. (2.21)) are defined by
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ} (3.17)
and
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρEˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1}. (3.18)
However, as mentioned in Section 3, various measure-theoretic difficulties
about the spectra of operators (and functions of them) arise in O. These
centre around the fact that if Bˆ = f(Aˆ) (so that there is a morphism fO :
Bˆ → Aˆ in O) then in general, the corresponding spectra (now consisting of
elements of IR, not of linear functionals on operators!) have only a subset
inclusion
f(σ(Aˆ)) ⊆ σ(f(Aˆ)) (3.19)
not necessarily an equality; though of course, if Aˆ has a pure discrete spec-
trum, then f(σ(Aˆ)) = σ(f(Aˆ)).
This situation prompts three further remarks:
1. For the role of Eq. (3.19) in defining the spectral presheaf on O, cf.
Section 2 of [2].
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2. As noted in Section 2.1 of [2], the set of self-adjoint operators on H
that have a pure discrete spectrum is closed under taking functions of
its members, and so forms a base-category Od on which we can define
a spectral presheaf and a coarse-graining presheaf in a manner exactly
parallel to the definitions over O.
3. For a more precise statement of the relation of f(σ(Aˆ)) and σ(f(Aˆ)),
cf. Eq. (2.9) of [2].
To sum up: it will be heuristically helpful to report what the results
in Section 3.2 imply about presheaves over O for those operators for which
these measure-theoretic difficulties do not arise. As just mentioned, this
will include all operators with a pure discrete spectrum; and the rest of this
Section can be read as strictly true for the spectral presheaf and coarse-
graining presheaf defined on Od.
We will do this in two stages, in the next two subsections. Both depend
on the following ‘definition’ of what we will call the elementary support of a
quantum state, relative to a stage (i.e., relative to an operator Aˆ in O). We
say ‘definition’ since the infimum of a family of Borel sets is not in general
Borel, so that the definition applies only in special cases, in particular in
Od. (And we say ‘elementary’, since these supports are, as usual, subsets
of IR, and we want to emphasise the distinction from the rigorously defined
supports discussed in Section 3.2.)
Definition 3.1 The elementary support, s(ψ, Aˆ), of a vector state ψ ∈ H
for a quantity Aˆ, is the smallest set (measure-theoretic niceties apart!) of
real numbers for which ψ prescribes probability 1 of getting a result in the
set, on measurement of the physical quantity A. And similarly for a density
matrix ρ. More precisely:
s(ψ, Aˆ) := infBorel{∆ ⊆ IR | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]ψ = ψ}. (3.20)
s(ρ, Aˆ) := infBorel{∆ ⊆ IR | tr[ρEˆ[A ∈ ∆]] = 1}.
3.3.1 Characterizing quantum valuations with elementary sup-
ports
Given this definition of supports, we can deduce a characterization of the
sieve-valued valuations on O associated with quantum states as defined in
Eqs. (3.17) and (3.18). This characterization is the analogue of those in
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Theorem 3.1, i.e., Eq. (3.3) of part (c), and in Theorem 3.2, i.e., Eq. (3.11);
and this characterization, being more concrete, is heuristically valuable.
For any Aˆ, ∆, and f : ∆ ⊆ f−1(f(∆)), we have Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] =
Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(f(∆))], and hence Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. This gives
as a sufficient condition for an arrow fO : Bˆ → Aˆ to be in ν
ψ(A ∈ ∆),
that f(s(ψ, Aˆ)) ⊆ f(∆). For suppose that f(s(ψ, Aˆ)) ⊆ f(∆). Then
Eˆ[A ∈ s(ψ, Aˆ)] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(s(ψ, Aˆ))] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. So since
Eˆ[A ∈ s(ψ, Aˆ)]ψ = ψ, we have Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ.
This condition, that f(s(ψ, Aˆ)) ⊆ f(∆), is also necessary. For since
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(f(∆))], we have that an arrow fO : Bˆ → Aˆ
is in νψ(A ∈ ∆) if and only if f−1(f(∆)) ⊇ s(ψ, Aˆ). But applying f to this
last we get: f(f−1(f(∆))) = f(∆) ⊇ f(s(ψ, Aˆ)).
Thus we have the result (strictly in Od, and in O, for those Aˆ, Bˆ,∆ for
which measure-theoretic difficulties do not arise):
νψ(A ∈ ∆) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ : f(∆) ⊇ f(s(ψ, Aˆ))}. (3.21)
This argument can be adapted to νρ and s(ρ, Aˆ). We use the fact that
fO : Bˆ → Aˆ ∈ ν
ρ(A ∈ ∆) if and only if tr[ρEˆ[A ∈ f−1(f(∆))]] = 1 if and only
if f−1(f(∆)) ⊇ s(ρ, Aˆ); which, applying f , implies that f(∆) ⊇ f(s(ρ, Aˆ)).
So we get the result (again, strictly in Od; and in O, measure-theoretic
difficulties apart):
νρ(A ∈ ∆) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ : f(∆) ⊇ f(s(ρ, Aˆ))}. (3.22)
Each of Eqs. (3.21) and (3.22) is clearly an analogue of part (c) of Theorem
3.1, which was
αV1(Pˆ ) = {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | G(iV2V1)(s(α, V1)) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )}. (3.23)
and of part (c) of Theorem 3.2,which was
αV1(Pˆ ) = {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | I
α(V1)|V2 ⊆ V1(Pˆ )|V2} (3.24)
In short we see that (i) Aˆ corresponds to V1; (ii) ∆ corresponds to Pˆ ; (iii) f
corresponds to coarse-graining byG(iV2V1) in Theorem 3.1, and by restriction
to V2 in Theorem 3.2; and (iv) elementary supports correspond to the rigorous
supports in Theorem 3.1 and to the intervals in Theorem 3.2.
We note incidentally that the fact that ψ ∈ H is determined by the set
of ‘certainly true’ pairs 〈Aˆ,∆〉 (i.e. the pairs for which ν(A ∈ ∆) = ↓ Aˆ),
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together with the fact that ψ itself determines ν = νψ by Eq. (3.17), implies
that ν = νψ is determined by the set of ‘certainly true’ pairs 〈Aˆ,∆〉. This
‘two-step-determination’ argument (going via ψ) shows that for pure quan-
tum states ψ, one of the sieve-valued valuations νψ (a sieve-valued valuation
that is induced by some or other ψ according to Eq. (3.17) is determined by
the ‘certainly true’ i.e. trueA assignments that it makes.
3.3.2 Supports give subobjects of Σ on O
We recall that assigning to each Aˆ ∈ O a subset a(Aˆ) of its spectrum σ(Aˆ)
gives a subobject of Σ (rather than the global elements prohibited by the
Kochen-Specker theorem) provided the assignment obeys the ‘subset’ version
of FUNC: viz.,
f(a(Aˆ)) ⊆ a(f(Aˆ)). (3.25)
In particular, elementary supports, as defined in Definition 3.1, induce sub-
objects of Σ—i.e. interval valuations obeying Eq. (3.25). For even if Aˆ has
in part a continuous spectrum, the subset conditions:
f(s(ψ, Aˆ)) ⊆ s(ψ, f(Aˆ)); f(s(ρ, Aˆ)) ⊆ s(ρ, f(Aˆ)) (3.26)
hold. So each of the interval valuations defined by
aψ(Aˆ) := s(ψ, Aˆ); aρ(Aˆ) := s(ρ, Aˆ)) (3.27)
is indeed a subobject of Σ. If Aˆ has pure discrete spectrum, Eq. (3.26)
becomes an equality, both for a vector state and a density matrix:
f(s(ψ, Aˆ)) = s(ψ, f(Aˆ)); f(s(ρ, Aˆ)) = s(ρ, f(Aˆ)). (3.28)
4 Defining sieve-valued valuations in terms of
subobjects of Σ
As we have seen, the correspondence, indeed mutual determination, in Sec-
tion 3 between sieve-valued and interval-valued valuations holds for a wider
class of valuations than just those discussed in Sections 2.5 to 2.7. In par-
ticular, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 used only the first clause of the definition in
Section 2.5 of a sieve-valued valuation (Definition 2.3), viz. the requirement
that a sieve-valued valuation obey FUNC. This situation suggests that it
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would be worth surveying different ways of defining sieve-valued and interval-
valued valuations—and the properties that ensue from these definitions. In
this Section we undertake a part of such a survey. It will show in particular
that the valuations we have considered are a very natural way to secure the
properties listed in the other clauses of Definition 2.3.
To be precise: we will focus on the role played in the results of Section 3 by
our having defined generalised valuations (with sets of morphisms as values)
in terms of the partial order relation at each stage. That is, we note that
in the discussion of global elements of G in Section 3.2.1, the results about
such valuations repeatedly invoked the partial order ≤ in G(V ) := L(V ) (cf.
in particular, (i) of Theorem 3.1); and in the discussion in Section 3.2.2 of
subobjects of Σ, the results repeatedly invoked subsethood ⊆ among subsets
of the spectrum σ(V ) (cf. (i) of Theorem 3.2). In both cases, the relation is
used at V2, the coarser of two stages V2 ⊆ V1, to connect a notion ‘intrinsic’ to
V2 (i.e., s(α, V2)) and I
α(V2) respectively) to a notion got by coarse-graining
from V1 (i.e., G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ) and V1(Pˆ )|V2 = V2(G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )) respectively).
So we will now ask how the properties of valuations taking sets of mor-
phisms as values that are defined in terms of interval valuations by using a
relation R to connect a notion intrinsic to a stage V2 to another notion got by
coarse-graining from a finer stage V1, depend upon the choice of the relation
R. That is to say, we will now consider the following schema for defining
from a given global element a of G, a valuation taking sets of morphisms as
values, in terms of an arbitrary binary relation R:
αa,RV1 (Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | a(V2) R G(iV2V1)(Pˆ )}. (4.1)
The analogous general schema starting from an interval valuation a that is
a subobject of Σ is
αa,RV1 (Pˆ ) := {iV2V1 : V2 → V1 | a(V2) R V1(Pˆ ) |V2}. (4.2)
Similarly, for the case of O (cf. Section 3.3), the general schema is
αa,R
Aˆ
(∆) := αa,R(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | a(Bˆ) R f(∆)}. (4.3)
But we will discuss only Eq. (4.1); our results carry over mutatis mutandis
to the cases of Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3).
This leads us to ask what conditions on R in Eq. (4.1) correspond, as
either necessary or sufficient conditions, to various properties of the valuation
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αa,R? The following results can be immediately verified. We give them in the
same order as the conditions listed in our original definition of a sieve-valued
valuation (Defn. 2.3. in Section 2.5).
(i) αa,RV1 (Pˆ ) is a sieve if and only if R is stable under coarse-graining in the
sense that if a(V2) R G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ), then for all V3 ⊆ V2, a(V3) R G(iV3V1)(Pˆ ).
Since a is assumed to be a global element of G, so that for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
a(V ′) = G(iV ′V )a(V ), the consequent in this condition becomes
a(V3) = G(iV3V2)a(V2) R G(iV3V1)(Pˆ ) = G(iV3V2)G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ). (4.4)
Since G is monotonic with respect to ≤, choosing R to be ≤, as we have
done (cf. Eqs. (3.1) and (3.3)) is a very natural way to secure sievehood.
(ii) For any relation R whatsoever, αa,R obeys functional composition in
the form of Eq. (3.2), i.e.
αa,RV2 (G(iV2V1(Pˆ )) = i
∗
V2V1
(αa,RV1 (Pˆ )). (4.5)
To see this, note that in the argument of part (b) of Theorem 3.1, any relation
R could be substituted for ≤.
(iii) αa,R obeys the null proposition condition, i.e. αa,RV1 (0ˆ) = ∅, if and only
if there is no V2 ⊆ V1 with a(V2)R 0ˆ (since 0ˆ coarse-grains to 0ˆ). Provided a
always assigns a non-zero projector, this condition is satisfied by our choice
of R as ≤.
(iv) αa,R obeys the monotonicity condition, i.e. if Pˆ ≤ Qˆ ∈ L(V1) then
αa,RV1 (Pˆ ) ≤ α
a,R
V1
(Qˆ), if and only if R is isotone under coarse-graining in the
sense that
[Pˆ ≤ Qˆ and a(V2)RG(iV2V1)(Pˆ )]⇒ a(V2)RG(iV2V1)(Qˆ). (4.6)
Since G is monotonic with respect to ≤, the natural sufficient condition
for this is that the relation R is stable under taking larger elements on its
left-hand side, i.e.
[Sˆ ≤ Tˆ and a(V2)R Sˆ]⇒ a(V2)R Tˆ . (4.7)
Again, the natural choice for satisfying this is that R is taken to be ≤.
(v) αa,R obeys the exclusivity condition, that if Pˆ Qˆ = 0 and αa,RV1 (Pˆ ) =↓V1=
trueV1 , then α
a,R
V1
(Qˆ) < trueV1 , if and only if
If Pˆ Qˆ = 0 and ∀V2 ⊆ V1, a(V2)RG(iV2V1)(Pˆ ), then ∃V3 ⊆ V1
such that not a(V3)RG(iV3V1)(Qˆ).(4.8)
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Here, the condition in terms of R is not very different from exclusivity in the
original form; and so seems not very illuminating. But provided a always
assigns a non-zero projector, this condition is satisfied by our choice of R as
≤. For if Pˆ Qˆ = 0 and, for all V2 ⊆ V1 we have a(V2) ≤ G(iV2V1)(Pˆ ), then
a(V1) ≤ Pˆ , so that ¬a(V1) ≤ Qˆ (since a(V1) 6= 0ˆ), and hence α
a,≤
V1
(Qˆ) 6=
trueV1 .
(vi) αa,R obeys the unit proposition condition, that αa,RV1 (1ˆ) = trueV1 ,
if and only if for all V2 ⊆ V1 we have a(V2)RG(iV2V1)(1ˆ) = 1ˆV2 (since 1ˆ
coarse-grains to 1ˆ). Again, the natural way for satisfying this is to choose
the relation R to be ≤.
These results show that there is a natural choice of the relation R, viz.
R :=≤, which is sufficient to yield all of the properties (i.e. clauses (i)–
(v) of Definition 2.3), provided a always assigns a non-zero projector. And
again this conclusion reflects the theme of Section 3, viz. the correspondence
between sieve-valued and interval-valued valuations, and in particular the
characterization Eq. (3.3) (part (c) of Theorem 3.1).
Furthermore, analogous results are easily verified for the schemas in Eqs.
(4.2) and (4.3). More precisely: taking the relation R as subsethood, ⊆
in these schemas is sufficient for these properties, provided some ‘regularity
conditions’ hold. These conditions include:
1. The analogue of the proviso above, that a always assigns a non-zero
projector (i.e. that a always assigns a non-empty subset).
2. The requirement that a defines a ‘tight’ subobject of Σ, in the sense of
Eq. (3.9).
3. For the case of O, (i.e. schema 4.3) for all bounded Borel functions f
and all Aˆ, we have the equality f(σ(Aˆ)) = σ(f(Aˆ)) (as always occurs
if Aˆ has pure discrete spectrum), not merely f(σ(Aˆ)) ⊆ σ(f(Aˆ)) as in
Eq. (3.19).
But we will not go into details of just how these regularity conditions make
choosing R as subsethood ⊆ sufficient for the various properties (i)–(vi)
above, for the schemas of Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3). But again the conclusion—that
taking R as subsethood in these schemas is sufficient for these properties—
reflects the correspondence in Section 3 between sieve-valued and interval-
valued valuations; and in particular the characterizations, Eq. (3.11) (for V:
part (c) of Theorem 3.2), and Eqs. (3.21) and (3.22) (for O).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended our topos-theoretic perspective on the as-
signment of values to quantities in quantum theory; principally using the
base category V of commutative von Neumann algebras introduced in [4]. In
Section 3, we compared our sieve-valued valuations with interval valuations
based on the notion of supports. This discussion (adding to some results
reported in Section 4 of [4]) had as its main theme a correspondence (mutual
determination) between certain sieve-valued valuations and corresponding
interval valuations. This correspondence was summed up (for V) in the char-
acterizations given in parts (c) of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, Eqs. (3.3) and (3.11);
and summed up more heuristically for O, in Eqs. (3.21) and (3.22).
In Section 4, we generalized this discussion: we gave a partial survey of
how in defining sieve-valued valuations in terms of interval valuations, cer-
tain properties of the sieve-valued valuations derive from the properties of
the binary relation R used in the definition. This survey again showed the
naturalness of our previous definitions. For taking R to be the partial order
≤ among projectors, or to be subsethood ⊆ among subsets of spectra, was a
natural and simple sufficient condition for the defined valuations to obey the
clauses of our original definition of sieve-valued valuations (Definition 2.3).
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